In Arrow's seminal analysis of optimal risk bearing in which he introduced contingent claim securities, he assumed preferences were representable by a state independent Expected Utility function. Although the classic contingent claim setting assumes agents choose over contingent consumption vectors conditioned on a …xed set of probabilities, later work on information economics suggested that allowing probabilities to change across contingent claim spaces could be an interesting extension. However the set of axioms that are necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of an Expected Utility representation for the classic contingent claim space with a …xed set of probabilities does not ensure that this form utility extends across multiple contingent claim spaces. In this paper, we derive a set of axioms on preferences which are necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of an Expected Utility representation when probabilities change. We also consider the incremental axioms which are necessary and su¢ cient for Expected Utility preferences to extend to the classic lottery setting of von Neumann and Morgenstern, where agents choose not only over consumption vectors but also over probabilities vectors.
Introduction
In the classic Arrow-Debreu contingent claim set up, one typically assumes that there are a …nite number of states and agents possess preferences over state contingent consumption. Arrow (1953) introduced contingent claim securities and derived conditions such that the allocation of risk-bearing by competitive securities markets is optimal. To simplify his analysis and derive clear results, he assumed that preferences are representable by a state independent von NeumannMorgenstern Expected Utility function. In Arrow's analysis, probabilities are …xed. Over the ensuing two decades, researchers began to consider the case of changing probabilities as they explored questions of speculation and the acquisition and value of information (see Rubinstein 1975, Hirshleifer and Riley 1979 for a classic overview and Schlee 2001 for more a more recent example). This literature continued to assume that risk preferences are representable by a state independent Expected Utility function as new information is obtained and probabilities vary.
Arrow, in explicitly citing the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem, e¤ectively borrowed their result despite the fact that his state contingent claim setting is quite di¤erent from the lottery setting assumed by von Neumann- Morgenstern (1953) and Samuelson (1952) . The contingent claim setting is based on a …xed set of state probabilities and varying state consumption payo¤s, whereas the lottery setting assumes arbitrary probability distributions where both probabilities and consumption payo¤s can vary. Clearly the lottery setting is more general, but the assumed completeness axiom requiring individuals to have preferences over the full space of distributions is very strong. Indeed both von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, p. 630) and Aumann (1962) argue that the completeness axiom is of "dubious validity".
Thus, it would seem desirable to develop an alternative set of axioms tailored to the narrower contingent claim choice space. This new set of axioms needs to accommodate the fact that the latter space, unlike the former, is not a mixture space.
1 Werner (2005) (building on Hens 1992) derived such a set of axioms which are necessary and su¢ cient for preferences to be representable by a state independent Expected Utility function. He followed the classic contingent claim set up in assuming a …xed set of state probabilities. However in applications such as the information models mentioned above and the contingent claim demand analysis in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) , it is natural to suppose that probabilities can vary. In this case, preferences need to be viewed as being de…ned on a set of contingent claim spaces characterized by a set of state probabilities. Unfortunately assuming Werner's axioms hold on each contingent claim space does not ensure that the NM index of the consumer's state independent Expected Utility function will be the same across the di¤erent spaces as probabilities change.
In this paper, we provide the additional axiomatic structure which is necessary and su¢ cient to extend Werner's analysis to the case where state probabilities can vary and thereby avoid making the overly strong assumption that agents possess preferences over the space of all possible probability distributions. One key axiom we use to ensure that the NM index is unchanged (up to a positive a¢ ne transform) across di¤erent contingent claim spaces is a modi…ed version of Tradeo¤ Consistency introduced by Wakker (1989) in a SEU (Subjective Expected Utility) setting. We require a modi…ed version of this axiom, because for us probabilities are exogenous, and not endogenous as in the SEU case.
One key aspect of preferences de…ned over the full set of contingent claim spaces corresponding to di¤erent probability vectors, is that the consumer chooses over consumption vectors, but never gets to choose over probabilities. This is in contrast to the case where preferences de…ned over risk prospects or lotteries and the decision maker can be viewed as choosing over both vectors of consumption plans and probabilities. We provide the incremental axioms which are necessary and su¢ cient to extend Expected Utility preferences with a non-changing NM index to the space of risky prospects. For this case, a Certainty Uniqueness axiom must be added. Alternatively, one can use a variation of the Werner axioms and an axiom similar to Probabilistic Sophistication (introduced by Machina and Schmeidler 1992 in a SEU setting).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we compare and contrast the choice spaces and Expected Utility representations associated with (i) contingent claims assuming a …xed set of probabilities, (ii) contingent claims assuming state probabilities vary as parameters and (iii) a set of probability distributions or risky prospects corresponding to the case where both probabilities and consumption vectors are choice variables. Section 3 develops the axiom (1953) and Samuelson (1952) Expected Utility theorem. In the contingent claim setting, Expected Utility must be based on an alternative set of axioms. system for Expected Utility de…ned over contingent claims. First we review the axioms for each contingent claim space conditioned on a …xed set of probabilities. Then we consider the set of axioms across di¤erent contingent claim spaces with varying probabilities, which result in an Expected Utility representation which is (i) characterized by the NM index being independent of probabilities and (ii) consistent with the demand tests discussed in Kubler Selden and Wei (2014) . In Section 4, we identify the incremental set of axioms required to go from Expected Utility preferences de…ned over a set of contingent claim spaces to Expected Utility preferences de…ned over the space of distribution, where the number of states is …nite. Section 5 gives an example illustrating how a utility transformation dependent on probabilities, which does not a¤ect contingent claim demands, can radically alter the shape of indi¤erence curves in the Marschak-Machina probability triangle. An Appendix is provided in which the indirect utility function used for the Section 5 Example 4 is derived.
Di¤erent Preference Domains
Assume there are S states of nature and there is a single consumption good in each state. A typical consumption plan is an S vector (c 1 ; c 2 ; :::; c S ) in the consumption space de…ned by R S + . We assume that probabilities are objective and known and denote the probability of state s by s . Let = ( 1 ; 2 ; :::; S ), where
P S s=1 s = 1g. Given this setting, we next de…ne three di¤erent choices spaces which we will investigate.
The …rst preference domain we consider corresponds to the classic ArrowDebreu contingent claim setup in which for each value of 2 S 1 a decision maker is assumed to have complete, transitive and continuous preferences over R S + which is denoted . The second preference domain arises if one assumes as in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) that the consumer confronts a sequence of independent contingent claim optimizations where probabilities and prices vary. Then corresponding to a set of probability vectors f g, there will be a set of preference relations f g which need not be equivalent. The set of preference orderings is assumed to be representable by a continuous and strictly increasing utility function U (c; ) : R S + ! R, which is C 1 in and where the notation U (c; ) indicates that corresponding to each , there will be a potentially di¤erent utility. It should be emphasized that for this set of utilities, the probability vector is allowed to change, but only as a parameter. One can view U (c; ) as being de…ned over a series of contingent claim spaces but not on their union. Therefore, although we can use U (c; ) to compare lotteries in each given contingent claim space, it cannot be used to compare the lotteries across the di¤erent contingent claim spaces. This is expressed geometrically in Figure 1 , where two states are assumed. Each shaded plane in the …gure corresponds to a contingent claim space with a given 1 . Preferences on the planes corresponding to The third choice space we consider is the full set of distributions corresponding to (c; ), or the set of "risky prospects". To make this precise, de…ne a risky prospect as a pair of vectors (c; ) 2 R S + S 1 . Assume that a decision maker has continuous, complete and transitive preferences over P = R S + S 1 , denoted P . For any …xed 2 S 1 this implies preferences are well de…ned. To distinguish the representation of P from the representation of f g, we use the notation U (c; ) instead of U (c; ). The former, in contrast to the latter, has both c and as arguments since one can compare lotteries across di¤erent contingent claim spaces, or slices in Figure 1 .
For each of the above three preferences cases, we provide in the next two Sections a set of axioms that is necessary and su¢ cient for preferences to be representable by an Expected Utility function. We next illustrate the di¤erence in the resulting Expected Utilities using the following example
(1) Note …rst that if, as in the standard contingent claim case, probabilities are …xed at 1 = 0:5, 2 = 0:3 and 3 = 0:2 (de…ning a speci…c slice in Figure 1 
Moreover it can be veri…ed that
and the utility (2) passes the Expected Utility test in Dybvig (1983) , implying that it can be viewed as an Expected Utility when probabilities are …xed and the NM index is given by
However when probabilities are allowed to vary and one considers preferences on di¤erent contingent claim spaces, the resulting contingent claim demands cannot pass the tests discussed in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) . The reason is that when probabilities vary, the NM index associated with the utility (1) will also change. In general, the kind of utility function in (1) takes the form
where f is increasing in its second argument and the NM index v is allowed to depend on probabilities. It should be emphasized that for the utility (1), the NM index
depends on but is state independent and thus is not denoted by v s; . The notation f ( ; ) indicates that on each contingent claim slice corresponding to each probability vector , one can consider a di¤erent increasing monotonic transform of the Expected Utility P S s=1 s v(c s ) and optimal contingent claim demands will not be altered.
Next consider the utility function 
More generally, the utility (7) takes the form
where f continues to be increasing in its second argument but the NM index v is independent of probabilities . Since (7) is an Expected Utility on each contingent claim slice in Figure 1 and the NM index is the same on each slice, it will result in demands that pass the tests in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) . From observing optimal contingent claim demands, one can never distinguish ordinal transformations in the utility function corresponding to f ( ; ). However when considering comparisons over lotteries, the utility function de…ned in (7) (and more generally (9)) cannot be viewed as an Expected Utility function. To see this, consider the following two lotteries L 1 =< 1; 2; 3; 0:2; 0:3; 0:5 > and L 2 =< 2; 1; 3; 0:3; 0:2; 0:5 >;
where the payo¤s in L 1 and L 2 , respectively, are given by 1; 2; 3 and 2; 1; 3 and the probabilities by 0:2; 0:3; 0:5 and 0:3; 0:2; 0:5. Clearly for any Expected Utility maximizer, L 1 and L 2 will be indi¤erent. However for the utility function (7) since 1 = 0:2 for L 1 and 1 = 0:3 for L 2 , we have
Hence from the lottery point of view, the transformation f ( ; x) = 1 x a¤ects the consumer's choice whereas it does not in a demand optimization. Because of the transformation, the probabilities do not enter into the utility function linearly and (7) is not an Expected Utility function. The probability weighting function for state i (i = 1; 2; 3) is 1 i . From this perspective, this utility form can be viewed as being more analogous to a Prospect Theory form (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979) than Expected Utility. Finally for the third choice space where preferences over lotteries (for a …nite number of states S), P , are represented by an Expected Utility function, the representation will take the form
where f is independent of probabilities and increasing and the NM index v is independent of probabilities. For instance in terms of the examples considered above, U (c; ) can take any monotone transform of
Remark 1
The negative exponential utility function (1) is used in this section to illustrates the di¤erent Expected Utility functions and respective preference domains considered in this paper. However the reader may not …nd the dependence of the NM index on probabilities particularly intuitive. A perhaps more behaviorally plausible example is given by the following
Without loss of generality, we can always assume that the state s = 1 is associated with the maximum consumption payo¤. In this case it would seem reasonable that increasing the probability 1 of this best state would result in the consumer becoming less risk averse. Computing the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion for the NM index, one obtains cu 00 (c)=u
. This is consistent with the intuition -increasing 1 results in a decrease of the Arrow-Pratt measure. The contingent claim demands, given a …xed set of probabilities, generated by the utility (14) will satisfy the Expected Utility test of Dybvig (1983) , but across contingent claim slices associated with varying probabilities the demands will not pass the demand tests of Kubler, Selden and Wei (2014) .
Preferences over Contingent Claims
In this section, we derive Expected Utility representations assuming preferences are de…ned over a single or set of contingent claims spaces conditioned on state probabilities. For the set of state probabilities S 1 , suppose that the corresponding set f g exists and is representable by U (c; ). We …rst give the representation result over each contingent claim space, where is speci…ed. Then we investigate the incremental axioms which are necessary and su¢ cient for the Expected Utility representation for each preference relation in the set f g to have the same NM index v, up to a positive a¢ ne transform, on each slice. We compare and contrast axioms in our risky setting with related axioms in the SEU setting.
Representation over Each Contingent Claim Space
In this subsection, we …rst consider the standard contingent claim setting where for each speci…c , U (c; ) takes the state independent Expected Utility form as in (5). We provide the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for this to be the case.
Based on the SEU (Subjective Expected Utility) literature a natural candidate axiom for U (c; ) to become a state independent Expected Utility is the following version of the Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom introduced by Wakker (1989) . 
Therefore Axiom 1 implies that the utility function is additively separable. However this axiom is not enough to ensure the existence of a state independent Expected Utility representation where the probabilities given exogenously as opposed to endogenously determined in the SEU formulation. To derive the representation result, we assume the following Risk Aversion axiom proposed by Werner (2005) . 4 Axiom 2 (Risk Aversion) For each 2 S 1 and a given c 2 R
where E (c) denotes the S-vector c for which c s = P S i=1 i c i for each s.
Then we have the following result.
Theorem 1 For each 2 S 1 , U (c; ) takes the following functional form
3 The SEU setting is considered in the seminal paper of Savage (1954) and further investigated in an extensive literature including the important papers of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and Wakker (1989) . For a more complete discussion of the SEU framework and associated axioms, see, for example, Wakker (1989) , Nau (2011) and Karni (2013) . 4 The intuition for the Risk Aversion axiom is that a certain payo¤ is always preferred to the uncertain payo¤ with the same mean. The surprising part is that with the assumption of additive separability, this axiom ensures that probabilities enter into the utility function linearly. 5 As noted in Section 2, U (c; ) is assumed to be a strictly increasing function. This can be guaranteed by the monotonicity of v and f in its second argument. Note that if v is strictly decreasing and f is also strictly decreasing in its second argument, U (c; ) is still a strictly increasing function. But this case can be also achieved by assuming both to be strictly increasing and thus it is ignored in Theorem 1. A similar argument holds as well for Theorems 2 -4.
where f is an arbitrary function that can depend on and is strictly increasing in its second argument and v is a strictly increasing and concave function, if and only if Axioms 1 and 2 hold.
Proof. See Werner (2005) for the proof. It will be noted that each NM index v is allowed to depend on probabilities. This is consistent with the utility (1) discussed in Section 2, which takes the form of U (c; ) in Theorem 1. Indeed it can readily be veri…ed that (1) satis…es Axioms 1 and 2 for each given probability vector.
In the SEU setting, the Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom by itself is necessary and su¢ cient for a state independent Expected Utility representation. Why do we need to also assume Axiom 2 in our setting? To answer this question, note that in the SEU setting the state independent Expected Utility takes the form
where v(c s ) is a state-independent utility function, unique up to a positive a¢ ne transformation, and ! = (! 1 ; ! 2 ; :::; ! S ) is a uniquely determined probability vector.
6
However in our setting since probabilities are given exogenously and not endogenously determined, the Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom can not ensure the endogenously determined ! matches the exogenously given . To see this more explicitly, consider the following two examples. The …rst one can be viewed as a variant of a Prospect Theory representation and the second one can be viewed a state dependent Expected Utility. Both examples satisfy Tradeo¤ Consistency.
Example 1 Assume that
Note that this representation can be viewed as
where
6 Since the SEU axioms imply the existence of a v and a !, we use in (19) the notation U (c) rather than U (c; !) to re ‡ect the fact that ! should not be viewed as a parameter that can be changed like our exogenously given .
Clearly the utility (20) satis…es Tradeo¤ Consistency and is a state independent SEU function. Although the utility satis…es the state independence requirement of Axiom 2, it does not satisfy the requirement that the probabilities enter into the utility function linearly.
Example 2 Assume that
Note that (23) can be rewritten as the state independent SEU
; ! 2 = 2 2 1 + 2 2 + 3 3
and ! 3 = 3 3 1 + 2 2 + 3 3
and (23) satis…es Tradeo¤ Consistency. However in our setting, the probability vector is exogenous and …xed and cannot be transformed into !. To see this implies that the utility (23) is not state independent, observe that it can be written as
where the NM index in each state is given by
which is clearly state dependent and violates our Axiom 2. Thus, the Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom in the SEU setting does not imply state independence in our setting, where probabilities are exogenous.
Representation over All Contingent Claim Spaces
Suppose rather than allowing the NM index v in Theorem 1 to vary as the state probabilities change, one wants to ensure that the set of preference relations f g are representable by a common state independent Expected Utility function across contingent claim slices as in Figure 1 . As shown in eqn.
(1), even if U (c; ) takes the state independent Expected Utility form in each contingent claim space, it may not be a state independent Expected Utility with respect to the set of preference relations f g. Interestingly, this additional requirement can be achieved by simply modifying the Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom 1, which is applicable to our setting of multiple slices and multiple probability vectors. 
then we must have 
This chain of indi¤erent consumption pairs is shown in Figure 2 (a) and (b) respectively, where we assume the Expected Utility representation
Axiom 3 is clearly satis…ed. 7 In the SEU setting, since the probabilities are endogenously determined, one only considers the case with a …xed probability structure like Figure 2 (a). Our contribution here is to assume Tradeo¤ Consistency holds where the probability structure changes as in Figure 2 (b). Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 For all 2 S 1 , U (c; ) takes the following functional form
where f is an arbitrary function that can depend on and is strictly increasing in its second argument and v is a strictly increasing and concave function if and only if Axioms 2 and 3 hold. 
Similarly, c 
Since Axiom 3 implies that eqns. (36) and (37) hold for any x; y; z; w, v and v 0 must be a¢ nely equivalent. Therefore, for any 6 = 0 2 S 1 , we must have
where a > 0 and b are some constants. Since the NM index is de…ned up to an a¢ ne transformation, we can conclude that
which completes the proof.
Preferences over Lotteries
In the previous section preferences were assumed to be de…ned over contingent consumption, and probabilities entered only as parameters. However suppose instead that a decision maker faces choices over di¤erent "risky prospects" or lotteries, which are de…ned as vectors (c; ) 2 R S + S 1 . As described in Section 2, we assume a continuous, complete and transitive preference ordering over P = R S + S 1 denoted by P . In this section, we consider what additional axioms beyond those in Theorem 2 are required to extend the state independent Expected Utility representation of f g to P . Maintaining Axioms 2 and 3, the following turns out to be necessary and su¢ cient.
Axiom 4 (Certainty Uniqueness) For any certain consumption c = (c 1 ; c 2 ; :::; c S ), where c s = c is a constant for each state s,
Axiom 4 assumes that the decision maker is indi¤erent between the same certain consumption vector on di¤erent contingent claim spaces parameterized by di¤erent probability vectors. In terms of Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 U (c; ) representing P takes the following functional form
where f is a strictly increasing function independent of probabilities and v is a strictly increasing and concave function if and only if Axioms 2, 3 and 4 hold.
Proof. Necessity is obvious. Next we prove su¢ ciency. It follows from Theorem 2 that Axioms 2 and 3 are equivalent to a utility representation of the form
where v(c s ) is a strictly increasing and concave function. It follows from Axiom 4 that 8c = (c; c; :::; c) 2 R S + and 8 ; 0 2 S 1 , we have
implying that f ( ; ) must be independent of probabilities.
Comparing the representations (34) and (41) in Theorems 2 and 3, respectively, Axiom 4 is necessary and su¢ cient for the transformation f to be independent of . For example, the introduction of Axiom 4 rules out eqn. (1) in Section 2 as a possible representation of P . It should be stressed that the form of utility in Theorem 3 is not veri…able at the demand level since whether or not the transformation f depends on probabilities cannot be determined from the contingent claim demand functions.
It is natural to wonder whether it is enough to use the Tradeo¤ Consistency Axiom 1 instead of the modi…ed version Axiom 3 together with Axioms 2 and 4 to obtain the desired result in Theorem 3. Unfortunately as the following example shows, this is not the case. 
which is independent of probabilities and hence Axiom 4 holds. For each …xed probability , (44) is clearly a state independent Expected Utility. Therefore, Axioms 2 and 1 hold. But obviously (44) does not take the form of (41) in Theorem 3.
Assuming Axioms 2 and 1 hold, is it possible to replace Axiom 4 by another axiom which ensures that U takes the form in (41)? Before introducing a new axiom, we de…ne some additional notation. For any (c; ), where 2 S 1 , assuming (c; ) corresponds to the random variable X, the cumulative distribution function is
Axiom 5 For any pair of random variables X and Y corresponding, respectively, to (c; ) and (c 0 ; 0 ), where ;
The intuition for this axiom is that for any pair of lotteries de…ned on di¤erent contingent claim spaces, if their respective cumulative distribution functions are the same, then the lotteries will be indi¤erent. This is consistent with both the NM index v and the transformation f being independent of . It is clear that Axiom 5 implies Axiom 4.
Remark 2 Axiom 5 will be recognized to be similar to the probabilistic sophistication property introduced by Machina and Schmeidler (1992) in an SEU setting (also see Grant, Özsoy and Polak 2008) . Because this property is based on subjective probabilities, it is necessary to introduce axiomatic structure to ensure that the endogenous probabilities satisfy probabilistic sophistication. However in the case of Axiom 5, the probabilities are given exogenously and the axiom can be directly assumed.
We next show that Axiom 5 together with Axioms 2 and 1 are necessary and su¢ cient for P to be representable by a state independent Expected Utility function where the NM index does not depend on probabilities in contrast to the case of Example 3.
Theorem 4 When S > 2, U (c; ) representing P takes the following functional form
where f is a strictly increasing function independent of probabilities and v is a strictly increasing and concave function if and only if Axioms 1, 2 and 5 hold.
Proof. Necessity is obvious. Next we prove su¢ ciency. It follows from Theorem 1 that Axioms 2 and 1 are equivalent to a utility representation of the form
Axiom 5 implies that
is independent of probabilities. Assume that
where f is independent of probabilities. It follows that 8c
implying that
If c 1 6 = c 2 = c 3 = ::: = c S = c then it follows from Axiom 5 that
is independent of s (s > 1), or equivalently, 
and
implying that v ( (c 1 ; c))
Therefore,
Since eqn. (62) 
where 00 1 and 00 2 are some arbitrary coe¢ cients. Combining eqn. (63) with (64) yields v (c) = 1 ( 1 ; 2 ; :::; S 1 ) v (c) + 2 ( 1 ; 2 ; :::; S 1 ) (8c) ;
where 1 and 2 are some arbitrary coe¢ cients and v is independent of probabilities. Therefore we have
Remark 3 We can compare the conditions in Theorems 3 and 4. For Theorem 3, although the Certainty Uniqueness axiom is easy to test, one needs to consider the modi…ed Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom. That means one needs to verify whether the Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom holds on di¤erent contingent claim spaces as shown in Figure 2 , which is complicated in general. For Theorem 4, one just needs to consider the traditional Tradeo¤ Consistency axiom and Axiom 5. In principle to conduct a laboratory test based on Theorem 4 is easier than based on Theorem 3. However, it should be noted that Theorem 4 only works for the S > 2 case since Axiom 5 converges to Axiom 4 when S = 2. Therefore, if there are only two states, one has no choice but use Theorem 3.
Finally, it is natural to inquire into the relationship between Theorem 4 and the conventional Expected Utility representation result based on the Strong Independence axiom (e.g., Samuelson 1952 and Grandmont 1972) . First let F denote the set of all cumulative distribution functions de…ned on the consumption space (0; 1). Assume preferences are de…ned over F, which is a mixture space. Since F consists all possible distributions, it is not restricted to S states. However, it can be easily seen that (50) is also the Expected Utility representation over F, if one restricts the number of the lottery states to be less than or equal to S. Indeed the Strong Independence axiom typically assumed for preferences over F holds for any mixture of lotteries where the maximum number of states of the lotteries is S. Therefore, the only di¤erence between the set of risk prospects P assumed in this section and F is that for the former the number of the states are …xed at S and for F, there is no restriction to the number of states.
Marschak-Machina Triangle
As noted above, although probability dependent transformations of state independent Expected Utility functions will not alter contingent claim demand behavior, they do change the consumer's preferences over lotteries. To see the implications of this, we consider in this section an example which utilizes the probability simplex proposed by Marschak (1950) and extended by Machina (1982) (often referred to as the MM (Marschak-Machina) triangle). It should be noted that in any given MM triangle, the payo¤ c s (s = 1; 2; 3) on each vertex is …xed and each point in the triangle corresponds to a di¤erent probability vector. We follow the convention of associating the largest, middle and smallest values of c s with the northern, southeastern and southwestern vertices of the triangle, respectively.
Example 4 Assume the following demand functions
(68) and
(69) where 1 6 = 2 > 1. These demands are well-behaved in the sense that the associated Slutsky matrix is negative semide…nite and symmetric, implying that (67) -(69) are consistent with the maximization of a quasiconcave utility function subject to the standard contingent claim budget constraint. They exhibit normal good behavior and since each demand is linear in income, the underlying preferences are homothetic. However, the system of equations (67) - (69) and 2 = 0, we obtain the following demands
and the indirect utility function 
(See the Appendix for the general derivation in terms of 1 and 2 .) To generate an indi¤erence curve in the MM triangle, one can …x a set of values corresponding to (V; c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) and then solve for the set (q 1 ; q 2 ; m; 3 ) when changing 1 . In Figure  3 , we …x (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) = (1; 2; 3) and draw two indi¤erence curves corresponding to V = 6 (green curve) and V = 7 (red curve), respectively. The shape of the indi¤erence curves clearly do not take the linear form associated with Expected Utility preferences. For general preferences over lotteries, it is standard to assume that preferences satisfy …rst-order stochastic dominance property. This condition requires that for any two random variables X and Y , if F X (z) F Y (z), then X is always preferred to Y . It is clear that …rst-order stochastic dominance implies our Axiom 4 (and hence Axiom 5). In the MM triangle, …rst-order stochastic dominance condition suggests the indi¤erence cannot bend back as in Figure 3 . 
Clearly the value of U j c 1 =c 2 =c 3 =c depends on the probabilities. It is natural to wonder whether there exists some transformation f to make the representation satisfy Axiom 4. And if this is possible, how will the transformation a¤ect the shape of the indi¤erence curves in the MM triangle? In order to make U j c 1 =c 2 =c 3 =c independent of the probabilities and satisfy Axiom 4, one can apply the transformation
9 See Camerer and Ho (1994) for a more detailed discussion and illustration of indi¤erence curve properties in the MM triangle. 10 Noting that the direct utility function U and the indirect utility function V only di¤er in arguments, we can use the form of the indirect utility function to get the direct utility function when c 1 = c 2 = c 3 . 
Fixing (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) = (1; 2; 3), we plot the indi¤erence curves corresponding to (78) in Figure 4 . It is clear that the indi¤erence curves are very close to parallel lines corresponding to the Expected Utility case and hence …rst-order stochastic dominance property appears to hold. Thus corresponding to the demand system (67)-(69), it possible to have the two very di¤erent sets of indi¤erence curves plotted in Figures 3 and 4 .
It is clear from the discussion of the example in this section that preference properties such as …rst order stochastic dominance relating to the shape of the indi¤erence curves in the MM triangle fail to be distinguishable at the corresponding contingent claim demand level. In fact, the set of lotteries in the MM triangle can be viewed as orthogonal to the set of lotteries in the contingent claims spaces parameterized by . In the contingent claim space, since the probabilities are …xed, any transformation based on probabilities f will not change the shape of the indi¤erence curves. Similarly, in the MM triangle, since the payo¤s are …xed, a transformation based on consumption values denoted by f c will not change the shape of the indi¤erence curves. But it is obvious that both the transformation f and f c will a¤ect general lottery comparisons in P. The relationship between preferences de…ned on these three spaces and the corresponding transformations is summarized in Figure 5 . It follows, as suggested by the Figure, that the existence of an Expected Utility representation for lotteries de…ned in the contingent claim space cannot ensure an Expected Utility representation over lotteries corresponding to the MM triangle and vice versa. However, if the preferences over lotteries in P are Expected Utility representable, taking the form in eqn. (50), then the ordering will be Expected Utility representable for lotteries de…ned in the contingent claim space and the MM triangle. In this appendix, we derive the indirect utility function that generates the demand functions in eqns. (67) 
Therefore the equation system (80)-(81) has a unique solution and we can simply integrate (80) to obtain the solution. If 1 2 6 = 0, integrating (80) yields
